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INTRODUCTION
Sustainable development links economic development with
protection of the environment and human rights.' It starts with
the premise that economic development is an indispensable pol-
* LL.M. International and Comparative Law, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center; J.D. Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, Uni-
versity of Cincinnati College of Law; Human Rights Law Certificate,
Ren6 Cassin Institute for Human Rights; B.A. Vassar College. The au-
thor is an Adjunct Professor of International Law at American Univer-
sity and was an Independent Consultant to the United Nations Com-
mission on Sustainable Development. The opinions represented in this
article are solely those of the author. Special thanks to Edith Brown
Weiss and Rumu Sarkar.
1. Intergenerational equity rights is one integral element of sus-
tainable development. See text infra accompanying notes 28-30. See gener-
ally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (1989);
Daniel Callahan, What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations, in
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (E. Partridge ed., 1981);
Anthony D'Amato, Agora: What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the
Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility: Do We Owe a Duty
to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
190 (1990); Edith Brown Weiss, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe
to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility: Our Rights
and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
198 (1990).
Also implicated are the rights of indigenous peoples. See Editorial,
Citizen Shell, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at A14; see also Deborah Frazier,
Third World Supporters Rip Exploitation, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 20, 1997,
at 13S.
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icy goal and a right,2 but that such development must be "eco-
logically, economically, and socially sustainable." At the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio
Conference) ,3 the international community declared that "envi-
ronmental protection ... constitute [s] an integral part of the de-
velopment process and cannot be considered in isolation from
it.''4 The Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development (WCED), 5 further, officially recog-
nized the critical implications for human rights in development
decisions. 6
Integrating sustainability principles with development has
come to be viewed as an imperative rather than an aspiration. As
noted by economist Michael E. Colby, developing countries in
the 1980s came to recognize that they were compromising their
own future development potential by adopting environmentally
unsustainable development practices:
A vicious circle of poverty and ecological destruction has been
set up, often as a direct result of 'development,' with a unifying
theme of increasing marginalization of people and the land on
which they live. Natural resources and ecological services are
now becoming 'scarcer,' and so economic practice must incor-
porate them. 7
Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs) involved in funding de-
velopment projects have taken significant steps in recent years to-
ward incorporating sustainable principles into their loaning
guidelines and procedures.
2. See REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN
ENVIRONMENT, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1, U.N.
Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1973), princs. 1, 2 [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration].
3. See Rio Declaration, United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, princ. 3 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
4. Id. princ. 4.
5. WORLD COMM'N ENV'T & DEVEL. (WCED), OUR COMMON FUTURE
(1987) [hereinafter BRUNDTLAND REP.].
6. Id. at 43; see also Problems of the Human Environment, G.A. Res.
2398 (XXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218,
para. 4, at 2-3 (1968).
7. See MICHAEL COLBY, WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
IN DEVELOPMENT 12 (1990).
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This article examines the fundamental principles and imple-
mentation goals8 of sustainable development and the MFI re-
sponse, specifically, the procedures and guidelines of the World
Bank (the Bank).9 Part I formulates a working definition of sus-
tainable development derived from scholarly interpretations and
international community standards. Part II first extrapolates the
Bank's internal definition of sustainable development and its en-
vironmental policy, and then proceeds with an examination of
the Bank's potential for effective enforcement of sustainable de-
velopment through its Inspection Panel. 10 Part III analyzes the re-
vised draft changes to the Bank's environmental assessment pro-
cedures. The article concludes with an evaluation of the World
Bank's success in embracing and incorporating sustainable devel-
opment goals.
I. DEFINING "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT"
Prior to the late 1960s, development goals were evaluated
predominantly in economic terms, with little or no consideration
of potential negative impacts on the environment." Similarly, en-
8. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Agenda Item 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONE151/PC/100/Add. 1 (1992) [here-
inafter Agenda 21] (plan of action accompanying the Rio Declaration,
supra note 3); see also AGENDA 21: 'EARTH'S AcTION PLAN (Nicholas A.
Robinson ed., 1993).
9. The World Bank refers to the collective group of four institu-
tions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the
International Development Association; the International Finance Cor-
poration; and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. The Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development is the original
member of the World Bank Group. See Articles of Agreement of the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, as amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T.
1942, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
10. World Bank Inspection Panel, Res. 93-10 (IDA Res. 93-6), Int'l
Bank Reconstruction & Devel. Doc. SecM93-988 (Int'l Devel. Ass'n Doc.
SecM93-313) (Sept. 22, 1993).
11. See COLBY, supra note 7. During this earlier period, "frontier
economics" was the prevailing ideology for development:
At its most basic [frontier economics] treats nature as an in-
finite supply of physical resources (i.e., raw materials, energy,
water, soil, and . . .air) to be used for human benefit, and
as an infinite sink for the by-products of the development
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vironmental regulation responded primarily to economic utility
and commerce factors. 12 The sustainable development principle
emerged, in large part, from changes in conception of the pri-
orities and purposes of environmental regulation and its relation
to development policy. It will therefore be useful briefly to review
the evolution of international environmental regulation and de-
velopment concepts in formulating a working definition of sus-
tainable development.
The first major shift in priority and purpose of environmental
regulation occurred during the 1950s and early '60s when the
atomic age and the toxic materials released by nuclear bomb
testing induced a move toward the establishment of safety stan-
dards and the assignment of legal liability for environmental
harms.1 3 The late '60s and early '70s was another turning point,1 4
and consumption of these benefits, in the form of various
types of pollution and ecological degradation.
Id. at 9 (citing Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Space-
ship Earth, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY (Henry
E. Jarrett ed., 1966)).
12. The first international agreement relating to the environment
was the Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture,
1902, Paris, 30 Martens Menvlan Recueil (ser. 2) 686; 102 B.F.S.P. 969
(1902). Other early treaties which defined the priorities of the times in-
clude: United States-Mexico Convention Concerning the Equitable Dis-
tribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, 1906,
UN Doc/St/Leg/Ser. 8/12, 34 Stat. 2953, 9 Bevans 924 (1902) (first
treaty to address regulation of natural resources shared by two or more
states); and Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931,
49 Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 349 (first treaty to address the economic use
of natural resources existing in a territory owned by no particular terri-
tory or state).
13. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contem-
porary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. LJ. 675, 677
(1993) [hereinafter Brown Weiss, New World Order]. Some early exam-
ples of multilateral treaties which address environmental harm from
the atomic age include: Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1043, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956
U.N.T.S. 251, 677; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmos-
phere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Moscow, 1964, 14 U.S.T. 1313,
480 U.N.T.S. 43.
14. See Brown Weiss, New World Order, supra note 13, at 678.
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witnessing the creation of domestic environmental regulatory
bodies; 5 a growing recognition among newly independent na-
tions of a right to a clean and healthy environment; 6 a multilat-
eral declaration of intent to protect the global environment;
7
and the institution of an international environmental body, the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).18
The General Assembly resolution calling for the first United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment asserted, in
1968, that protecting the environment and respecting human
rights were interrelated:
[Pollution and other environmental harms violate] the condi-
tion of man, his physical, mental and social well-being, his dig-
nity and his enjoyment of basic human rights, in developing as
well as developed countries. 19
The resulting document, the Stockholm Declaration, 20 in 1972,
made this new integrated policy explicit in its Preamble:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and ade-
quate conditions of life in an environment of a quality that per-
15. The Council on Environmental Quality was created in 1971. See
40 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1991) (implementing Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1343 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1991).
16. Virtually all national constitutions adopted or revised since
1970 recognize an environmental right in one form or another. See
ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw
27 (1991).
17. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2.
A growing class of Environmental problems, because they are
regional or global in extent or because they affect the com-
mon international realm, will require extensive co-operation
among nations and action by international organisations in
the common interest. The Conference calls upon Govern-
ments and peoples to exert common efforts for the preserva-
tion and improvement of the human environment, for the
benefit of all the people and for their posterity.
Id. pmbl.
18. UNEP was mandated to gather, disseminate and examine in-
formation relating to international environmental concerns. See Institu-
tional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Co-
operation, G.A. Res. 2997, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 43,
U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
19. Problems of the Human Environment, supra note 6, para. 4, at 2-3.
20. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2.
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mits a life of dignity and well-being. 21
The Brundtland Report,22 in 1987, took the culminating step
to a fully integrated policy as it concluded that environmental
protection, human rights and development practices are interde-
pendent and interrelated:
A development path that is sustainable in a physical sense ...
cannot be secured unless development policies pay attention to
such considerations as changes in access to resources and in
the distribution of costs and benefits... [which] implies a con-
cern for social equity between generations, a concern that must
logically be extended to equity within each generation. 23
The Brundtland Report succinctly defined sustainable develop-
ment with respect to protecting the environment and rationally
and equitably meeting the developmental needs of present and
future generations. 2 4 Building upon the conclusions of the
Brundtland Report, the Rio Declaration, 25 in 1992, expanded
upon the definition of sustainable development and established
an "Earth's Action Plan" in its accompanying "Agenda 21."26
.21. Id. pmbl.
22. BRUNDTLAND REP., supra note 5.
23. See id. at 43; see also supra note 1; infra text accompanying notes
28-30.
24. Id.
25. See Rio Declaration, supra note 3.
26. See AGENDA 21: EARTH'S ACTION PLAN, supra note 8. Broadly
speaking, Agenda 21 is concerned principally with integrating environ-
mental and developmental goals in all relevant activities throughout
the United Nations system and within States parties' domestic legisla-
tion. See id.
Concurrent to the UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was formed
for the purpose of promoting, monitoring and reviewing States parties'
progress in implementing the principles of Agenda 21, the Program of
Action of the 1992 Conference. Toward this end, the Commission en-
gages in (a) promoting dialogue between the various United Nations
organizations, non-governmental organizations and others in both pri-
vate and government sectors; (b) making recommendations on "capac-
ity-building programmes, information networks, task forces and other
mechanisms for regional and subregional levels integration of environ-
mental and developmental goals"; and (c) submitting reports to the
General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council on rec-
ommended means of implementing the integrated environmental and
developmental goals. The CSD receives its information from member
[Vol. IX
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Professor Philippe Sands has proposed that four distinct legal
principles comprise the sustainable development paradigm:
(a) equitable use;
(b) intergenerational equity;
(c) sustainable use; and
(d) the integration of environmental concerns with develop-
ment strategies. 27
"Equitable use" addresses the current exploitation of natural
resources and calls for each nation to use no more than its fair
share as a member of the global community.2 "Intergenerational
equity" adds the dimension of a generational time line to the
conceptual natural resources "pie." Intergenerational equity asks
that the present generation preserve the environment and ab-
stain from depleting natural resources to the point where future
generations would have impaired use.29 The principle of in-
tergenerational equity was recognized in the Stockholm
Declaration:
The natural resources of the earth . . . must be safeguarded for
the benefit of present and future generations . . .30
Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration approaches the dual goals of
equitable use and intergenerational equity from the perspective
of production and consumption patterns worldwide. Chapter
Four of Agenda 21 states:
[T]he major cause of the continued deterioration of the global
environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and
production, particularly in industrialized countries, which is a
matter of grave concern, aggravating poverty and imbalances.31
governments, including periodic communications and reports, as well
as from non-governmental organizations. See Commission on Sustainable
Development, Outline of a Multi-Year Thematic Programme of Work for the
Commission, U.N. Doc. E/CH.17/1993/2 (interpreting GAOR 47/191,
para. 3). See also Report of the Commission on Sustainable Development on Its
First Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/1993/3/Add.l.
27. See Philippe Sands, International Law in The Field of Sustainable
Development: Emerging Legal Principles, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 58-62 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995).
28. Id. at 60.
29. Id. at 58-59.
30. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2, princ. 2.
31. Agenda 21, supra note 8, ch. 4.3.
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Agenda 21 proposes a three-point strategy to redress unsustain-
able production and consumption patterns:
(a) Management-related activities;
(b) Data and information;
(c) International cooperation and coordination.3 2
Before definite strategy conclusions can be drawn, comprehen-
sive information gathering and analysis must be undertaken on
present consumption and production patterns, as well as on con-
ditions of economic growth, wealth and prosperity.33 Further-
more, the implementation of any global strategy of sustainable
production and consumption will, by definition, require interna-
tional cooperation and coordination. 34
"Sustainable use," the third prong of the sustainable develop-
ment paradigm, refers to a strategy of responsibly exploiting nat-
ural resources such that use will remain within the "carrying ca-
pacity of the environment, ' 35 and within the bounds of
renewability.3 6 Sustainable use mandates the maintenance of nat-
ural resources at their current level, with no contraction of the
currently existing resource stock. 37
These three preceding principles - equitable use, intergener-
ational equity, and sustainable use - support and merge into
Professor Sands' fourth principle: the integration of environmen-
tal concerns with development strategies. 38
Thus, a working definition of the sustainable development
principle, as recognized by the international community and le-
gal scholars is:
32. Id. ch. 4.7-4.13.
33. Id. ch. 4.10-4.11.
34. Id. ch. 4.12-4.14.
35. See Sands, supra note 27, at 27; see also Agenda 21, supra note 8,
ch. 4.11.
36. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
Dec. 2, 1946, pmbl., 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, cited in Sands, supra
note 27, at 59.
37. But see Ismail Serageldin & Andrew Steer, Epilogue: Expanding
the Capital Stock, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE: FROM CONCEPTS
TO ACTION 30 (World Bank Environmentally Sustainable Development
Occasional Paper Series No. 2, 1994) for an alternative approach to de-
fining sustainable development. See also infra Part IIA.
38. See Sands supra note 27, at 61; see also Rio Declaration, supra
note 3, princs. 2, 4.
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(1) a right to development,39 that involves
(2) the equitable use of resources among the nations, devel-
oped and developing,4° and
(3) the equitable use of resources across generations,41 consist-
ing of,
(4) sustainable use,42 and
(5) the integration of environmental concerns with develop-
ment strategies. 43
In sum, this means development that respects and preserves the
environment such that current and future generations will have
their fair and equitable share.
II. THE WORLD BANK AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
As mentioned in Part I, until relatively recently, MFIs did not
make provisions for non-economic factors, such as environmental
protection or human rights, in their lending decisions. In fact,
they were seemingly prohibited from doing so. The Articles of
Agreement of the World Bank, for example, make explicit the
requirement that only economic considerations shall be evalu-
ated in loan-making decisions:44
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political af-
fairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their deci-
sions by the political character of the members concerned.
Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their deci-
sions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially to
achieve the purpose [of the World Bank] .... 41
39. Rio Declaration, supra note 3, princ. 3; see also Problems of the
Human Environment, supra note 6, para. 4; Stockholm Declaration, supra
note 2, pmbl.
40. See BRUNDTLAND REP., supra note 5, at 43; Rio Declaration, supra
note 3, princs. 5-12; Sands, supra note 27, at 60.
41. See BRUNDTLAND REP., supra note 5, at 43; Rio Declaration, supra
note 3, princ. 3; Sands, supra note 27, at 58-59.
42. Rio Declaration, supra note 3, princ. 11; Agenda 21, supra note
8, ch. 4.11; Sands, supra note 27, at 59.
43. Sands, supra note 27, at 58-62.
44. See Gunther Handl, Sustainable Development: General Rules versus
Specific Obligations, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw, supra note 27, at 41 (1995).
45. Articles of Agreement of the Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, supra note 9, art. 5.
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The concern of the World Bank's creators was to prevent politi-
cal strong-arming by the wealthier nations that could occur if
loans were made conditional on non-economic factors. However,
while the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank may operate
to preclude the attachment of environmental conditions to loan-
making decisions, they are silent on the use of non-economic fac-
tors, including environmental standards, in the structuring of loan
projects. It is at the planning, approval and execution phases of
the projects that the loaning institution has great latitude in de-
cision-making and can act as a major force in the advancement
and implementation of environmentally sustainable development
procedures.
As early as 1970, in fact, the World Bank, under the presidency
of Robert McNamara, was the first MFI to create a full-time envi-
ronmental review office: the Permanent Environmental Advisor.
Despite this bold effort at reform, the Bank's record in advanc-
ing environmentally responsible development throughout the
1970s and '80s was abysmal, as it funded large-scale projects
which resulted in negative and even irreversible impacts on the
environment.46 The past decade has seen significant structural re-
form in World Bank policies and in the structuring of decision-
making processes and evaluation methods, including the adop-
tion of an environmental operational directive in 1991, 47 the cre-
ation of the World Bank Inspection Panel in 1993,48 and, most
recently, the ongoing revision of the environmental operational
procedures. 49
However, the potential for the Bank to implement sustainable
development practices is hindered by three principle factors:
(a) the Bank's interpretation of the meaning of sustainable
development;
46. See generally 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH, U.S. CAMPAIGN ANNUAL REPORT
(1994). For case evaluations on environmentally harmful loan deci-
sions, see BRADFORD MORSE & T. BERGER, SARDAR SARovAR: THE REPORT
OF THE INDEPENDENT REvIEw (1992) and WORLD BANK, EFFECTIVE IMPLE-
MENTATION: KEY TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT, REPORT OF THE PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE (1992).
47. Operational Directive 4.01: Environmental Assessment (World
Bank Operational Manual, Oct. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Operational Di-
rective 4.01 (1991)].
48. See World Bank Inspection Panel, supra note 10; see also infta Part
II.B.
49. See infra Part III.
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(b) the capacity of the Inspection Panel to reach and uphold
independent, transparent and accountable decision-making with
the Bank's environmental procedures; and
(c) the degree of clarity and transparency in the Bank's envi-
ronmental procedures themselves.
The extent to which Bank procedure and policy reforms will
result in substantive environmentally sustainable development
procedures is the subject of the following sub-sections.
A. The World Bank's Definition of Sustainable Development
The Bank's internal working definition of sustainable develop-
ment appears to be modulated to suit, first and foremost, the ec-
onomic priorities of the Bank as a lending institution, without
satisfactorily integrating environmental and human rights con-
cerns. The Bank's approach premises that four categories of capi-
tal exist, including: "[H]umanmade or 'fabricated' capital (ma-
chines, factories, buildings, and infrastructure), natural capital
[natural resources] ... human capital (investments in education,
health and nutrition of individuals), and social capital (the insti-
tutional and cultural bases for a society to function). ' 50 The
Bank appears to view these four categories of capital stock as in-
terchangeable elements in a policy of sustainability such that any
one element may be traded for another without resulting in an
overall reduction in sustainability among the four elements
combined: ,
[The capital stock approach to sustainability] clearly enables us
to set aside the simplistic view that sustainability requires leav-
ing to the next generation exactly the same amount and com-
position of natural capital [natural resources] as we found our-
selves, and to substitute a more promising concept of giving
future generations the same, if not more, opportunities than we
found ,ourselves .... This new paradigm immediately opens the
door for substituting one form of capital for another5 1
According to this model, therefore, a decrease in the "capital
stock" of natural resources, such as clear-cutting an old growth
forest, would be acceptable as long as it was accompanied by a
proportional increase in the capital stock of fabricated capital,
50. Serageldin & Steer, supra note 37.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
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such as the improvement of the infrastructure through the build-
ing of roads.
The Bank's extremely broad view of the sustainable develop-
ment principle thus may lead to some profoundly environmen-
tally unsustainable results and belies the spirit of the Stockholm 52
and Rio Declarations.53 As discussed supra, sustainable develop-
ment does not mean a simple trade-off of environmental destruc-
tion for the sake of economic development. A trade-off would
describe a transaction that exchanges one good for another and
presumes an equivalent value for the set of goods on both sides
of the trade. In notable contrast, sustainable development is an
integrated principle - not the either-or choice of the construc-
tion of roads or power plants as substitutions for natural re-
sources - but a principle of protection and preservation of nat-
ural resources themselves within the context of respect for
human rights.
Thus, the Bank's internal definition of sustainable develop-
ment immediately restricts the Bank's capacity for promoting in-
ternationally recognized sustainable development practices.
B. The World Bank Inspection Panel
The World Bank established, in 1991, environmental impact as-
sessment standards as part of its lending procedures,5 4 as well as
a policy of promoting environmental sustainability in its develop-
ment decisions.5 5 Additionally, in an unprecedented move among
52. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2.
53. Rio Declaration, supra note 3.
54. See Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47. The crea-
tion of' environmental impact assessment policies and procedures is a
relatively recent occurrence among multilateral and regional develop-
ment institutions. The Council of the European Communities was the
first, in 1985, with its Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of Cer-
tain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 27 June, 1985,
which required all European Community member states to formulate
environmental impact procedures. The World Bank adopted Opera-
tional Directive 4.01 in October of 1989, which established its environ-
mental impact assessment procedures. The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development adopted environmental procedures in
February, 1992. See CENTER FOR INT'L ENVTL. L. (CIEL), A COMPARISON
OF EIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REGIMES (1995).
55. Including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
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international lending institutions, the Bank created an Inspec-
tion Panel, in 1993, to further the goal of greater transparency of
and accountability to its established procedures. 6 The Inspection
Panel's ability to uphold sustainable development procedures,
however, is impaired by its questionable independence from
Bank control, loyalty issues, and the clarity and transparency of
the newly revised Bank's environmental procedures.
The Inspection Panel was established as an independent forum
to investigate complaints brought by "affected parties '5 7 alleging
a violation of rights or interests caused by the Bank's failure to
follow its own operational procedures. 8 However, some specifica-
tions of the operational procedures of the Panel itself appear to
conflict with the ostensible independence and goals of the Panel.
The procedural rules for nominating, appointing and remov-
ing the members of the Panel raise immediate questions of its
actual independence. The Panel is composed of three members,
nominated by the Bank president and appointed by the execu-
tive directors of Bank member countries.59 Each member of the
Panel is required to be of a different nationality.60 The executive
ment, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the Council of the European Communities.
56. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 8-
9 (1995).
57. The Panel's procedures specify that the term "affected party"
precludes a single individual complainant and includes "a community
of persons such as an organization, association, society or other group-
ings of individuals." World Bank Inspection Panel, supra note 10, para. 12.
The complaint must establish a causal link between an action or omis-
sion of the Bank resulting from a failure of the Bank to follow its own
operational policies and procedures and an actual or likely injury to
the rights or interests of the affected party. See id.
58. Id. paras. 1, 12. For an extensive discussion on the procedural
history and framework of the World Bank Inspection panel written by a
World Bank associate, see SHIHATA, supra note 56, ch. 2 (1995). For a re-
view of the events leading up to the establishment of the Panel and the
role that the Panel may play in advancing human rights and interna-
tional law, see Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private
Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L.
553 (1994).
59. See World Bank Inspection Panel, supra note 10, para. 2.
60. Id.
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directors of the Bank can permanently remove a member of the
Panel for cause. 61
The requirement that the Panel members be of different na-
tionalities is a positive step toward achieving diversity of back-
grounds for the purpose of achieving culturally balanced deci-
sionmaking. However, the Panel may benefit from additional
background diversity requirements, such as limiting the number
of members who are from developed countries to a maximum of
two of the three, so that at least one and possibly even two mem-
bers may be from developing countries during a given term. The
Bank may also want to consider achieving a degree of gender
balance among Panel members, particularly because a significant
majority of the Bank's development projects impact dispropor-
tionately on women in developing countries. 62 For example, ad-
ding to the rules of procedure a preference that at least one
member should be a woman during each term would go a long
way toward improving, or at least supporting, gender equity in
Bank procedures and in Panel decisions.
The rule that the members of the Panel must come from Bank
member countries seems a reasonable restriction despite a possi-
ble concern that a Panel member who comes from a member
country may have a greater interest in finding in favor of the
Bank. On the other hand, this potential conflict of interest
seems to be a minor concern, and indeed, regardless of whether
or not one comes from a member country, one could be just as
likely to find in favor of the Bank either to maintain or to create
a good relationship. Further, Panel procedures protect against a
multitude of conflict of interest concerns, as they allow for the
temporary disqualification of a specific Panel member from hear-
ing or investigating a particular matter in which he or she has,
or has had, a significant involvement, whether personal, profes-
61. Id. para. 8.
62. Women (and children) often make up the greatest number of
impoverished and disenfranchised individuals. Additionally, sustainable
development goals often involve a pivotal role for women. Principle 20
of the Rio Declaration asserts that: "Women have a vital role in envi-
ronmental management and development. Their full participation is
therefore essential to achieve sustainable development." Rio Declaration,
supra note 3, princ. 20.
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sional or otherwise. 63
A greater conflict of interest problem is raised, however, by
the specification in paragraph ten of the operational procedures
that "members of the Panel . .. shall be subject to the require-
ments of the Bank's Articles of Agreement concerning their ex-
clusive loyalty to the Bank. . .. "64 Does this mean that the Panel
shall be exclusively loyal to the Bank, in the narrow sense of loy-
alty to upholding the letter of the rules and procedures of the
Bank? Or does this mean that the Panel must be exclusively and
generally loyal to the Bank in the broad sense of promoting the
best interests of the Bank as an institution, and if so, would it
ever strictly be permissible to decide against the Bank and in
favor of the complainants? Surely it is arguable that where the
Bank has failed to uphold its own procedures, then a Panel deci-
sion against the actions or omissions of the Bank could work to
the Bank's long-term benefit. It is also reasonable to deduce,
however, that the short-term harm to the Bank's reputation, were
the Panel to decide against the Bank, would violate, or at least
compromise, the Panel's exclusive loyalty requirement to the
Bank.
The stated independence of the Panel is strengthened by the
procedural requirement that members of the Panel must not
have served as executive directors, alternates, advisors or staff
members of the Bank for two years before their appointment to
the Panel.65 The fact that service in the Bank and service on the
Panel may not overlap, and furthermore, that a two-year period
must pass separating the two, reduces the possibility of conflict
of interest or interdependence between the Panel and the
Bank. 66 The Bank, thereby, has made an effort to distinguish
Bank service from the investigatory service of the Panel.
63. See World Bank Inspection Panel supra note 10, para. 6.
64. Id. para. 10.
65. Id. para. 5.
66. This division may be compared to the United States' require-
ment that military persons must be decommissioned before serving in
the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government, which
thereby maintains a clear distinction between military and political
service.
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Greater concerns regarding the independence of the Panel do
exist; the principal one is that it is the same body - the execu-
tive directors of the Bank - that both appoints the Panel mem-
bers and can permanently remove them for cause. 6 A further
concern is that this body, by its mandate, exists to preserve the
policies of the World Bank. The Panel procedures do not ex-
pand upon what may constitute a "for cause" removal of a Panel
member. It is conceivable that where a Panel member consist-
ently finds against the Bank and in favor of the complainants
and where his or her reasoning is deemed unsatisfactory by the
executive directors, that such decision making or reasoning
might constitute cause for removal. Thus, there exists a need for
greater clarification on the causes for removal as well as the pro-
cedures for deciding upon removal. For example, must a deci-
sion to remove be taken as a majority vote of the executive direc-
tors, and may one member of the executive directors veto a
decision to remove? May a Panel member be removed only
where he or she acts in violation of established Bank procedures,
but not merely against Bank policies? Without such clarifications,
the independence of the Panel is questionable, and without in-
dependence, the stated purpose of the Panel is compromised.
III. THE WORLD BANK'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
The environmental procedures of the World Bank were for-
mally established in October, 1991 in Operational Directive
4.01.68 Presently, the Bank is in the process of reformatting and
revising the Operational Directive (OD) for the stated purpose
of "pr'ovid[ing] clearer guidance on the Bank's policy to its
staff. ' 69 Operational Directive 4.01 is being reformatted into
three separate writings: Operational Policy (OP), Bank Proce-
dures (BP) and Good Practices (GP). 70 The OP and BP will be
67. See World Bank Inspection Panel, supra note 10, para 8.
68. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47.
69. Letter from Andrew Steer, Dir. World Bank Envtl. Dep't, to
David Hunter, Ctr. Int'l Envtl. L. (Nov. 3, 1995) (on file with Fordham
Envtl. LJ).
70. Id.
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mandatory procedures, while the GP will be advisory only.71 The
revised OP, BP and GP will serve as the guidelines according to
which the World Bank Inspection Panel will decide upon allega-
tions of violations resulting in environmental harm.
The Bank has been actively soliciting comments from repre-
sentatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on these
revisions. While the Bank's interest in feedback from NGOs is
viewed as a positive move, concern is raised over the Bank's ex-
plicit restriction that comments should not address the substance
of the procedures de novo, and should be "limited to whether the
substance of the former policy withstood the conversion, and
whether the various elements are correctly placed in the OP, BP
and GP statements." 72
Moreover, the policy statements that formerly were sprinkled
throughout the original text, and which provided clarity of pur-
pose and guidance to the borrower in preparing the EA and in
observing sustainable development practices, are notably absent
in the revised draft. It might be hypothesized that perhaps the
Bank is attempting to appear less paternalistic in choosing to use
conclusory statements over policy remarks. Or perhaps the Bank
has chosen to step aside from the role of policy standard-setter
so as to avoid accountability issues that may arise where policy
has been violated and where a complaint reaches the Inspection
Panel. This latter explanation is supported by the Bank's deci-
sion to clarify, in numerous locations of the revised Draft, that
preparation and follow-through of the EA is the responsibility of
the borrower, not the Bank. Clearly, with the creation of the In-
spection Panel, which did not exist as of the drafting of the orig-
inal OD 4.01, the Bank theoretically exposes itself to being held
accountable for statements in its Operational Directives, Opera-
tional Procedures or Operational Policy.
The proceeding sections compare and contrast OD 4.0171 with
the draft version of OP 4.01, BP 4.01 and GP 4.01, 7 4 using the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47.
74. Draft OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment (World Bank, Oct.
1995) [hereinafter Draft OP 4.01 (1995)]. The structure of this compar-
ison and analysis follows the division headings of the Operational Di-
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headings of the original OD 4.01 as a frame of reference:
(A) Purpose and Nature of Environmental Assessments (EAs);
(B) Types of Environmental Analysis;
(C) Institutional Aspects; and
(D) EA Procedures.
The overall substantive environmental impact protections which
the new procedures purport to advance also will be commented
upon.
A. Purpose and Nature of Environmental Assessments (EAs)
Subsection 1 of the revised OP appears to sacrifice clarity as to
the specific timing for preparing the EA. The revised version es-
tablishes that EAs are undertaken to improve decision making
for projects that are under consideration for Bank financing, 75 but
provides little additional detail as to when the EA should be un-
dertaken. The revised procedures do state that "the Bank favors
preventive measures over mitigatory or compensatory measures,
whenever feasible," 76 thereby reaffirming that the EA should be
undertaken prior to the execution of the project, and that the
"EA is initiated as early as possible in project processing and is in-
tegrated closely with the economic, financial, institutional, social,
and engineering analyses of a proposed project." 77 The original
OD 4.01, by contrast, specified that the "EA is carried out during
project preparation, before appraisal, and is closely linked to the
feasibility study,"78 and further, that "[a]ll environmental conse-
quences should be recognized early in the project cycle and
taken into account in project selection, siting, planning, and de-
sign.."7 9 These statements in OD 4.01 were in keeping with inter-
national standards which establish that preliminary EA studies
rective 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, and also is founded, and expands
upon a preliminary draft of suggested revisions to the World Bank En-
vironmental Assessment Procedures, prepared by Dana Clark and David
Hunter, Center for International Environmental Law (September,
1995) (on file with the Fordham Envtl. L.J.).
75. Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 1 (emphasis added).
76. Id. para. 2.
77. Id. para. 3 (emphasis added).
78. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para. 1.
79. Id. para. 2.
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should be conducted at the same time as the feasibility study.80
Clarity as well as transparency are significantly gained, how-
ever, regarding the scope of the EA through OP 4.01's expansive
definition of the term "environmentally sound and sustainable":
"Environmental concerns encompass the natural environment
(air, water, and land); human ecology and health and safety; and
sociocultural issues such as cultural heritage, indigenous peoples,
new land settlement, involuntary resettlement, and induced
development."81
OP 4.01 contains a direct, although not particularly specific,
statement on the process by which the EA will advance the goal
of sustainable development: "Natural and social conditions need
to be considered in an integrated way."' 82 OD 4.01, while it did
not state the goals of sustainable development quite as elegantly
or succinctly, did include considerable detail as to the purposes
of the EA, 83 thereby providing practical and needed information
for EA preparers and reviewers.
80. ECONOMIC & SOC. COMM'N ASIA & PAC., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: GUIDELINES FOR PLANNERS AND DECISION MAKERS (1985); see
RAYMOND F. MIKESELL & LARRY WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL BANKS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 48 (1994).
81. Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, at 1.
82. Id.
83. Operational Directive 4.01, para. 2 stated:
By calling attention to environmental issues early, EAs (a) al-
low project designers, implementing agencies, and borrower
and Bank staff to address environmental issues in a timely
and cost-effective fashion; (b) reduce the need for project
conditionality because appropriate steps can be taken in ad-
vance or incorporated into project design, or alternatives to
the proposed project can be considered; and (c) help avoid
costs and delays in implementation due to unanticipated en-
vironmental problems. EAs also provide a formal mechanism
for interagency coordination on environmental issues and for
addressing the concerns of affected groups and local nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs). In addition, the EA pro-
cess plays an important role in building environmental man-
agement capability in the country.
Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47.
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B. Types of Environmental Analyses
While OD 4.01 provided detailed information defining the
character and distinct parameters of project-specific EAs and re-
gional and sectoral EAs, and then gave additional specifications
for the content of EAS in its Annexes, the revised version
presents a brief definition of three principal types of EAs in OP
4.01 and then delegates the explanation of general EA parame-
ters exclusively to the GP 4.01 Annexes*.84 At first glance, this ap-
pears to be a more streamlined approach. However, upon closer
review, one can see that this is not a mere reformatting of infor-
mation to improve clarity.
First, considerable detail and clarity has been lost in the re-
vised Draft OP 4.01 regarding: (a) under what circumstances the
regional or sectoral EAs are appropriate and even preferred; (b)
the distinct advantages of these EAs over project-specific EAs;
and (c) the scope of regional and sectoral EAs. Dana Clark and
David Hunter of the Center for International Environmental Law
(CIEL) have commented that "[r]eplacing a well-articulated par-
agraph that explains objectives of the policy and the type of ac-
tivities which are appropriate . ..with an abstract and less-de-
tailed sentence presents serious issues." 85
Second, delegating all detail of the contents of the EA to the
GP Annexes has two negative effects. One effect is that of remov-
ing any mandatory force which the original text carried, because
the GP section and its Annexes are advisory only, while inclusion
in the OP or BP sections would have indicated a mandatory pro-
cedure. OD 4.01 specified important elements that "[p]roject-
specific EAs should normally cover"86 and "[sectoral EAs] are
particularly suitable for reviewing,"8 7 and in so doing forcefully
suggested the proper content of specific EAs. The information in
the Annexes of the revised draft, by contrast, is presented as a
suggested checklist of potential issues for an EA, rendering all is-
sues mere potential topics for consideration, with none of any
84. Compare id. paras. 7-10, with Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note
74, para. 4.
85. Clark & Hunter, supra note 74, at 5.
86. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para. 4.
87. Id. para. 5.
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higher importance, and with no single element required. The
second effect is that it appears to reduce the importance of any
particular element of the EA, which formally was emphasized up
front, as an integrated part of the definition of the EA types and
then re-emphasized in checklist format in the Annexes.
The draft revised OP 4.01 has reformatted and added a new
topic heading for EAs of Special Project Types, including Sector
Investment Lending; Financial Intermediary Lending; Emergency
Recovery Projects; and Loan Guarantee Projects. 88 The subsec-
tion on Global Issues that appeared in the original OD 4.01 has
been deleted in the revised OP 4.01. The only vestige of this for-
mer subsection appears in the GP, Annex A, in the Checklist of
Potential Issues for an EA in the "global externalities" listing.89
The Global Issues section served to raise awareness as to the exis-
tence of international environmental guidelines, encouraged
their consideration, but made clear that the Bank uses its own
guidelines.90 While deleting this section as it was written was not
a great loss, clarity would have been gained if it had been
strengthened rather than deleted. A revised section on Global Is-
sues could have stated something to the effect that the Bank
seeks to integrate international standards into its own procedures
"with the view to minimizing possible adverse impacts on global
environmental quality."91
Sector Investment Lending and Financial Intermediary Lend-
ing, formerly merged into one subsection, has now been divided
into two distinct subsections. 92 Dividing these two types of
projects into two separate paragraphs improves clarity as to defin-
ing the project types. Clarity is also gained, while transparency
and potential Bank accountability is reduced, however, by the ad-
dition of the following statements. First, footnote eleven in the
Sectoral Investment Lending subsection states that "the imple-
88. See Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 7-10.
89. Compare id., with Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note
47, paras. 9-11.
90. See Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para. 11.
91. This quote appeared in the original Operational Directive 4.01,
para. 11, but was buried and thereby weakened in context.
92. Compare Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para.
9, with Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, paras. 7-8.
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menting institution remains ultimately responsible for ensuring
that subprojects meet Bank requirements, ' 93 which squarely
removes the Bank from accountability for inadequately processed
environmental reviews of subprojects. Second, under the Finan-
cial Intermediary Lending subsection, the Bank also removes it-
self from accountability for the quality and content of the sub-
project EAs: "the Bank expects the financial intermediary to
ensure that an appropriate EA is carried out for each sub-
project." 94 Clark has noted, and the author of this article agrees,
that these statements may be "an attempt to eliminate Inspection
Panel review of failures to follow Bank policies on subprojects." 95
Additionally, a powerful statement of overall sustainable devel-
opment goals in relation to EAs and sector and financial inter-
mediary lending that appeared in the original OD 4.01 has been
omitted from the revised draft with no alternative statement of
goals replacing it: "The aim [of the Bank] should be to help es-
tablish satisfactory environmental review systems in the appropri-
ate agencies, rather than to focus only on those investments
against which the Bank happens to disburse." 96 The former state-
ment indicated a strength of conviction that is compromised by
its absence in the revised text.
Clarity is lost in the revised subsection on Emergency Recovery
Projects. While the original OD 4.01 explained: "Because emer-
gency recovery projects need to be processed rapidly, and seek
mainly to restore existing facilities, they would not normally re-
quire a full EA," 97 the revised version merely provides this con-
clusory statement: "For an emergency recovery project, there
may not be time to prepare an EA report."9 The revision opens
up the possibility that it will be acceptable for a full EA not to be
prepared under emergency conditions other than those that seek
to restore existing facilities. 99 Clarity would be improved if the re-
93. Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, at 6 n.11.
94. Id. para. 8.'
95. Clark & Hunter, supra note 74, at 3.
96. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para. 9.
97. Id. para. 10.
98. Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 9.
99. Clark characterizes this change as "seem[ingly] more dismis-
sive of the need for an EA for Emergency Recovery Projects." Clark &
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vision instead had defined under what types of emergency recov-
ery circumstances the EA will be excused.
The revised Draft adds a short subsection on Loan Guarantee
Projects, making explicit the requirement of an EA for such
projects. A footnote to this subsection notes, however, that the
type of EA required carries distinct rules.1°° Since the overriding
goal of the EA is to ensure environmentally sustainable develop-
ment, concern will be raised if such rules are more lax for EAs
for projects which are directly funded by the Bank.101
C. Institutional Aspects
The original OD 4.01 contained two subsections under the In-
stitutional Aspects heading: "Strengthening Environmental Capa-
bilities" and "Environmental Advisory Panels."'1 2 The revised OP
4.01 consists of one brief paragraph entitled "Institutional
Capacity."103
The "Strengthening Environmental Capabilities" section origi-
nally opened with a policy statement: "The ultimate successes of
EA depends upon the capability and understanding of environ-
mental matters of the government agencies concerned,"'' 0 4 and
then provided practical details on institution-building. Mandatory
language was used throughout this subsection, including the fol-
lowing statements: "as part of the EA process, it is necessary to
identify relevant environmental agencies and their capability for
carrying out required EA activities. Projects with potentially ma-
jor impacts normally require the strengthening of several environ-
mental functions."'05
Hunter, supra note 74, at 4.
100. Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, at 8 n.15, refers the
reader to OP/BP 14.25, Loan Guarantees for specific EA requirements,
which will be drafted at a future time.
101. Clark & Hunter note that creating an alternative tier of EA
rules is a substantial change from current practice. See Clark & Hunter,
supra note 74, at 4.
102. See Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, paras. 12-
13.
103. !iSee Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 11.
104. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para. 12.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
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The revised Draft OP 4.01 section contains no policy state-
ment. The affirmative role delineated for the Bank in the origi-
nal OD has been changed to a more passive and only "as neces-
sary" role. The formerly mandatory language has been changed
to advisory, whereby the Bank now "encourages" certain capacity-
building measures.10 6 The practical details on institution-building
also have been omitted from the revised Draft OP.
The subsection on Environmental Advisory Panels and in fact,
any reference to the benefits of including independent experts
in the EA process, has been omitted from the revised Draft. In
OD 4.01, the Bank recommended that for "major, highly risky,
or contentious projects with serious and multi-dimensional envi-
ronmental concerns, the borrower should normally engage an
advisory panel of independent, internationally recognized, envi-
ronmental specialists.. -107 Additionally, the Bank recom-
mended "for projects with potentially major adverse environmen-
tal impacts . . . the borrower should retain independent EA
experts not affiliated with the project." 10 8 The omission of these
highly useful recommendations is conspicuous and does not ad-
vance sustainable development goals. 09
D. EA Procedures
The revised version's presentation of EA procedures presents
significant changes to two major subsections. First, the reposi-
tioning, reformatting and revising of the section on Environmen-
tal Screening calls for close examination. Second, the sections on
the Involvement of Affected Groups and Nongovernmental Orga-
nizations and on Disclosure of Information have been revised
both in positive and in negative ways.
It is significant that the section on Environmental Screening
has been moved up front to the OP section, as has the detailed
information on determination of to which category a specific
106. Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 11.
107. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para. 13.
108. Id. para. 16.
109. "The deletion of this language represents a major step back-
ward from a policy of encouraging review of projects by objective,
outside experts." See Clark & Hunter, supra note 74, at 6.
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project will be assigned. 10 The assignment of the project into
one of three categories - A, B or C"1' - is the defining step for
determining the required scope of the EA and even whether an
EA will be necessary at all.112
The revised OP 4.01 should be commended here for providing
greater detail and improved transparency regarding: (a) how the
Bank determines into which category a project is assigned; (b)
the required content of the EA by category; and (c) the appropri-
ateness of alternatives to EA.
The original OD 4.01 Annex E merely stated that "[b]est pro-
fessional judgment is essential" for determining the categories,
and left the process by which the categories were determined to
the task manager and the regional environmental division. 113 It
gave only conclusory statements as to the character of the EA ac-
cording to category, stating simply that a full EA was required
for Category A projects; a full EA was not required for Category
B projects, but environmental analysis was required; and neither
an EA nor environmental analysis was required for Category C
projects. 14
The revised OP 4.01, by contrast, not only provides a clear def-
inition of the three categories, but also expands upon the Bank's
110. Compare Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47,
para. 17, with Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 6.
111. The three project categories, as described in the revised Draft
OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 6, are as follows:
Category A: [a project that] is likely to have significant
adverse environmental impacts that may be sensitive, irrevers-
ible, diverse, comprehensive, broad, or precedent-setting.
Category B: [a project where the] impacts are site-
specific in nature and do not significantly affect human
populations or alter environmentally important areas, includ-
ing wetlands, native forests, grasslands, and other major natu-
ral habitats . . . [where] [flew of the impacts are irreversible,
and in most cases mitigatory measures can be designed more
easily than those for Category A projects.
Category C: [a project that] is unlikely to have adverse
environmental impacts or its impacts are likely to be negligi-
ble, insignificant or minimal.
112. No EA is required for a category C project.
113. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, Annex E.
114. Id. Annex E, para. 1.
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standards for content and analysis.'15 Most notably, the revised
draft makes explicit two requirements: (a) the "without project
situation" alternative must be considered for those Category A
projects which have the potential to cause more harm than
good, and (b) affected people and local NGOs must be con-
sulted for all Category A projects. 1 6
The paragraph discussing alternatives to EA, formerly its own
subsection under the rubric of "Types of EA," has been moved
in the revised draft to the subsection discussing Category B EAs.
It is now clear that the "alternatives to EA" is a subpart of the
Category B analysis, and is not appropriate for Category A or
Category C projects.
One additional change to the environmental screening sec-
tion, however, appears to reduce rather than improve clarity and
transparency. The original OD 4.01 Annex E explicitly stated that
the EA category was "assigned by the task manager (TM), with
the concurrence of the Regional Environment Division
115. Relevant excerpts of Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74,
para. 6 state as follows:
EA for a Category A project examines the project's potential
negative and positive environmental impacts, compares them
with those of feasible alternatives (including, as appropriate,
the 'without project' situation), and recommends any mea-
sures needed to prevent, minimize, mitigate, or compensate
for adverse impacts and improve environmental perform-
ance. Category A EA always involves consultations with pro-
ject-affected people and local nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs)....
EA for a Category B project may vary from project to
project, but it is narrower in scope than Category A EA. Like
Category A EA, it examines the project's potential negative
and positive environmental impacts and recommends any
measures needed to prevent, minimize, mitigate, or compen-
sate for adverse impacts and improve environmental per-
formance. As appropriate, the results of the Category B EA
may be documented in a separate report tailored to the par-
ticular environmental issues of the proposed project, but it
may only be necessary to describe them in the project
documentation.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
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(RED)."'1 7 The revised OP 4.01 states rather cryptically that
"It]he Bank classifies the proposed project." Does this change to
the text actually remove or reduce the involvement either of the
TM or the RED, or does it perhaps simply reduce clarity as to
accountability?
Several changes have been made to the sections on the In-
volvement of Affected Groups and Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions and on Disclosure of Information.
First, the policy statements that provided guidance to borrow-
ers as to why public consultation and public disclosure are im-
portant have been omitted from the revised Draft OP 4.01.118 In
contrast, the one policy statement that remains includes
mandatory language that was lacking in the original. The revised
Draft states that "the borrower is required to consult project-af-
fected groups and local NGOs about the project's environmental
aspects," 119 a positive change from the original version which
stated that, the Bank "expect[ed]"1 20 the borrower to take such
views into account. However, the strength of conviction that was
conveyed in the original version by the statement that the bor-
117. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, Annex E.
118. OD 4.01 stated the following:
Regarding Public Consultation:
This process is important in order to understand both the
nature and extent of any social or environmental impact and
the acceptability of proposed mitigatory measures, particu-
larly to affected groups. Consultations do not reduce the de-
cision authority of the borrower, but are a valuable way to
improve decision making, to obtain feedback on the EA pro-
cess and draft report, and to increase community coopera-
tion in implementing the recommendations of the EA.
Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para. 19.
Regarding Public Disclosure:
In order for meaningful consultations to take place between
the borrower and affected groups and local NGOs, it is nec-
essary that the borrower provide relevant information prior
to consultations.
Id. para. 21.
119. Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 12 (emphasis
added).
120. Operational Directive 4.01 (1991), supra note 47, para. 19
(emphasis added).
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rower was expected to take the views of the public "fully into ac-
count in project design and implementation, and in particular in
the preparation of EAs," 12' has been considerably diluted by the
omission of the word "fully" in the revised Draft.
122
Second, while the original OD 4.01 did not restrict the need
for consultations as to any particular Category of projects, the re-
vised draft clarifies that "for Category A projects, the borrower
consults such groups at least twice." 23 Additionally, this clarifica-
tion results in some ambiguity in the revised OP 4.01, because
the first sentence of the relevant paragraph is a generalized state-
ment requiring public consultation "in preparing a project for
Bank financing,"' 24 which presumably applies to any project for
Bank financing. If, however, the second sentence of the para-
graph, specifically addressing Category A projects is meant to
modify the first sentence, and further, if the remainder of the
paragraph is meant to apply only to Category A projects, then
such a change would be cause for serious concern. This would
result in a significant reduction in the standards of transparency
of EA reports other than Category A reports.
Third, the revised Draft achieves greater clarity on the issue of
the timing, both for public consultation and for the release of
the EA report to the public, but more specific guidelines are
needed. OP 4.01 states that "for [public] consultations [to be]
meaningful, the Bank expects [a summary of the EA's conclu-
sions] to be provided in a timely manner. . "..,,2 BP 4.01 states
that "[f]or all Category A projects and for Category B projects
that will require a separate EA report . .. before the Bank pro-
ceeds to project appraisal ... the EA report must be made avail-
able in some public place accessible to affected groups and local
NGOs and must be officially submitted to the Bank.... ,"126 Pre-
cisely how long in advance the report must be made public re-
121. Id. para. 19 (emphasis added).
122. Compare id., with Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para.
12.
123. Draft OP 4.01 (1995), supra note 74, para. 12.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Draft BP 4.01: Bank Procedures (World Bank, Oct. 1995),
para. 7.
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mains unanswered. And the term "in a timely manner" as used
above is vague. Instead, the Bank could consider integrating the
wording of the Pelosi Amendment 27 into the revised OP and BP
texts, requiring that the Bank abstain from approving or re-
jecting any Category A or Category B project that fails to make
an EA summary available to the public at least 120 days prior to
the date for consideration of approval. 28
CONCLUSION
In summary, the newly revised draft environmental procedures
of the World Bank and the recently created Inspection Panel are
cause both for optimism and concern. Together they may exert a
significant role in promoting sustainable development practices,
if clarity and transparency in the procedures genuinely are en-
hanced and if the Panel is allowed to act independently. Alterna-
tively, they may become an example of grandstanding by the
Bank and serve the Bank's distinct and undeniably unsustainable
definition of sustainable development.
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